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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GENEVA MELDRUM
Plaintiff-Respondent
-vs.KLARENCE MELDRUM
Defendant-Appellant

Case No.
13684

APPELLANTS BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant, Klarence Meldrum,
from that part of a judgment which directed payment to
plaintiff of $23,714.58 from funds held in escrow under a
contract of sale executed by plaintiff and defendant, and
denying defendant relief which he claims to be entitled to
under that contract. Defendant contends that the trial
court erred in failing to give effect to the contract of sale
and in interpretation of a written agreement for extension
of time; also in rejecting evidence offered by defendant to
show no default on the part of defendant; also in refusing
to award defendant judgment as prayed for in his
counterclaim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After trial of issues the court directed counsel for
defendant to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions
of law and judgment. This was done and counsel for
plaintiff filed objections and a draft of proposed findings,
conclusions and judgment, to which counsel for defendant
filed objections. After further hearing the court took the
l
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matter under advisement and thereafter signed and
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment
substantially as propsed by counsel for plaintiff. Defendant then filed motion for new trial. This was'overruled
and denied by the court and defendant then filed notice of
appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant (appellant) prays for reversal of rulings of
the trial court on points herein contended by defendant to
be erroneous, and that the trial court be directed to render
judgment as prayed for in defendant's counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under date of April 1,1964, the plaintiff as seller entered
into a contract of sale with her son Klarence Meldrum as
buyer for sale of plaintiff's half interest in a ranch
property in Juab County and in approximately 30 head of
cattle and certain farm machinery and equipment. The
other half interest in the ranch and personal property was
owned by another son of plaintiff, viz. James R. Meldrum.
The property was covered by two mortgages, one to
Equitable Life Assurance Society and one to Ralph
Meldrum as administrator of the estate of Reed Duke
Meldrum. The contract between plaintiff and defendant
called for a purchase price of $40,000.00 to be paid in
annual installments of $2,500.00 on or before December 1 of
each year and defendant was required to assume payment
of plaintiff's portion of the mortgage debts mentioned but
was to be given credit on the purchase price for such
mortgage payments. Plaintiff was chargeable with 29 per
2
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cent of the mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance
Society and 50 per cent of the debt to Ralph Meldrum. The
remaining portions of such mortgage debts were chargeable against James R. Meldrum. A copy of the 1964
contract between plaintiff and defendant is attached to
plaintiff's complaint, (r.6-11)
After execution of the 1964 contract of sale, the
defendant, together with his brother, James R. Meldrum,
operated the ranch property until Aprill969 and made
payments required on the mortgage debts. Defendant also
paid to plaintiff various installments aggregating $8,004.11
prior to the execution of the Rasmussen contract
hereinafter referred to. (r.165)
On or about September 1968 the defendant and his
brother, James R. Meldrum, were solicited by a realtor for
an option of sale of the ranch property and thereafter, on
or about April, 1969, a contract of sale was executed by
them. That contract, hereinafter referred to as the
Rasmussen contract, (R.12) provided for sale of the ranch
property to Lowell H. Rasmussen and wife, for a total
purchase price of $158,000.00. The plaintiff also signed that
contract. The purchase price was to be paid $5,000.00 down
and $20,000.00 on or before May 1,1969, and the balance in
annual installments of $19,000.00 plus interest at 5y2 per
cent on May 1 in the years 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and
1976. The contract provided that a real estate agent's
commission of $7,900.00 should be paid to the realtor out of
the first two installments of purchase price. The contract
further provided that the sellers should execute and
deposit in escrow with Walker Bank & Trust Company a
deed of the property and that payments should be made to
said escrow agent according to the terms of the contract.
The contract did not specify how payments made to the
3
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escrow agent were to be disbursed but did contain the
following provisions: (R.21,22)
''19. Sellers agree to execute a statement of how
and in what amounts the purchase price is to be
disbursed to the Mortgagees and the Seller
mentioned herein"
"25. The Seller agrees to furnish Walker Bank &
Trust Company, the escrow agent in this matter,
and the Buyer herein, with a statement of the
portion each Seller is to receive from the purchase
rice to be paid hereunder.''
Concurrently with the signing of the Rasmussen
contract two letters of instruction addressed to Walker
Bank & Trust Company as escrow agent were signed by
plaintiff and defendant and James R. Meldrum, copies of
which letters are attached to defendant's Affirmative
Answer and Counterclaim herein (R.32, R.34). These
letters show that no agreement had been made between
plaintiff and defendant as to allocation between them of
funds to be received by said escrow agent but do contain
the following recital: (R.33)
"The portion payable to Geneva Meldrum and
Klarence Meldrum shall be divided between them
as they may hereafter agree and notify said Walker
Bank & Trust Company, or as may hereafter be
determined by the court."
The Rasmussen contract was deposited with Walker
Bank & Trust Company at Provo, Utah, as escrow agent. A
copy of same is attached to plaintiff's complaint herein
(R.12). A copy of the 1964 contract of sale between plaintiff
and defendant is also attached to plaintiff's complaint
(R.6).
4
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After deposit of the escrow, a disagreement developed
between plaintiff and defendant as to distribution of funds
received by the escrow agent. Plaintiff contended that she
was entitled to 65.81 per cent of funds received and to be
received for credit of plaintiff and defendant, and that the
defendant was entitled to receive only 34.19 per cent of
such funds. (See allegations of plaintiff's complaint)
(R.5). Defendant disagreed with this contention but made
offers in writing to permit plaintiff to receive one-half of
funds received and to be received for credit of plaintiff and
defendant until plaintiff should be fully paid in accordance
with her 1964 contract with defendant. (Tr. A-57 and
Exhibit D-l-A, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5) Plaintiff rejected these
offers and contended that the 1964 contract with defendant
was superseded by the Rasmussen contract and that she
was entitled to 65.81 per cent of funds payable under said
contract for the half interest in the ranch property covered
by her 1964 contract with defendant.
Prior to date for payment of the 1970 installment on the
Rasmussen contract he requested consent of plaintiff and
defendant and James R. Meldrum to an extension of time
for making that payment, and offered to pay 8 per cent
interest instead of 5% per cent on the $19,000.00 installment
during such extension of time. The request was granted
and an agreement for extension of time signed by the
parties in language as follows: (R68)
"This agreement, entered into this
day of
April, 1970, by and between Geneva Meldrum,
Klarence T. Meldru, and James R. Meldrum,
hereinafter designated as the seller and Lowell H.
Rasmusson and Barbara Frazier Rasmusson,
husband and wife, hereinafter designated as the
buyer.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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WHEREAS, the seller desires to grant the buyer
an extension in making one of the payment due on a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, entered into between the parties relating to the real property in
Juab County, State of Utah, and more particularly
described in said Uniform Real Estate Contract as
being dated November 1, 1968, with the above
named persons as the parties thereto and.
WHEREAS, buyer desires to pay more interest
for the extension as the consideration for the extension in one payment.
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises hereinafter set forth, the parties agree as
follows.
1. Seller hereby grants to the buyer an extension
of time to make the payment due on May 1, 1970,
under Uniform Real Estate Contract, dated November 1,1968, between sellers and buyer relating
to property in Juab County, State of Utah, and
sellers agree to extend the $19,000.00 plus an
accrued interest payment due on May 1,1970, under
said contract so that it will not be due until on or
before September 15, 1970, and all other payments
are to be as provided for in said Uniform Real
Estate Contract.
2. In consideration of this extension, buyer agrees
to increase the interest from 5% per cent per
annum to 8 per cent per annum on the $19,000.00
payment and for the period from May 1, 1970, until
said $19,000.00 payment plus an acrued interest is
paid on or before September 15, 1970, but it is
understood that all other principle which is unpaid
shall bear the 5% per cent per annum rate provided
for in said Uniform Real Estate Contract and all
other payments provided under said contract shall
be due and payable in the manner provided for in
said Uniform Real Estate Contract.
3. Except as hereinbefore expressly stated, both
seller and buyer agree that the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, dated November 1, 1968, between
them relating to the property in Juab County, shall
6
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remain in full force and effect and the terms shall
be as provided for therein.''
The 1970 installment of principal and interest was not
paid until May 5,1971, at which time a payment was made
in the amount of $46,374.84. Counsel for plaintiff had
notified Walker Bank as escrow agent not to pay anything
to defendant except upon written stipulation or order
signed by plaintiff or final adjudication by the court, and
the bank had followed plaintiff's instructions. But during
the impasse as to distribution of funds, several stipulations
were signed at various dates between plaintiff and
defendant for release of specified amounts to plaintiff and
defendant respectively but with express provisions tha
such stipulations should not be construed as evidence as to
the rights of either party in the final distribution of
escrowed funds. Pursuant to these stipulations the escrow
agent had paid out various amounts to plaintiff and
defendant. The escrow agent also made payments on the
Equitable Life mortgage and the Ralph Meldrum mortgage in accordance with original instructions given to it.
(R.165,166)
On January 17, 1972 plaintiff commenced this action,
setting forth in the complaint (R.6) the 1964 contract of
sale executed by plaintiff and defendant, also the 1969
contract with Rasmussen (R.12) and alleging that the
Rasmussen contract "constituted a form of novation" of
the 1964 contract and that the Court should determine
(R.5) that the plaintiff is entitled to receive 65.81 per cent
of funds received and to be received from the Buyer under
the Rasmussen contract. Also alleging that defendant
should be required to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees and
costs. The complaint also alleged that at the time of
execution of the Rasmussen contract the defendant had
7
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paid to the plaintiff $11,509.79 leaving a balance of
$28,490.21 then due on the principal of the 1964 contract.
The complaint prayed for judgment that plaintiff is
entitled to receive 65.81 per cent of sums received and to be
received by the paties under the Rasmussen contract and
that the escrow agent be ordered to disburse to plaintiff
65.81 per cent of funds received by it under said contract,
also that plaintiff should have judgment against defendant
for any sums he had received in excess of 34.19 per cent;
also that plaintiff have judgment for attorney fees and
costs.
To this complaint the defendant filed his answer and
counterclaim (r.25). In this the defendant admitted the
execution of the 1964 contract with plaintiff and the
execution on or about April 1, 1969 by plaintiff and
defendant and James R. Meldrum of the Rasmussen
contract. Defendant denied that he was at fault or in
default on his 1964 contract with plaintiff at the time of
execution of the Rasmussen contract or at any later time
and denied that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for
attorney fees or costs and alleged that on the contrary
defendant was entitled to his costs and attorney fee.
As a further and affirmative defence defendat specifically denied that the Rasmussen contract constituted any
novation or substitute for his 1964 contract with plaintiff.
Defendant alleged that his 1964 contract was in full force
and effect and that at the time of execution of the
Rasmussen contract defendant had paid to plaintiff on his
1964 contract the sum of $8,004.11 and was then also
entitled to credit for mortgage payments made by him on
plaintiff's portion of mortgages to Equitable Life Assurance Society and Reed Meldrum required by said 1964
contract to be paid by defendant. Defendant further denied
8
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that the Buyers under the Rasmussen contract had paid
the sum of $79,000.00 on defendant's equity under said
contract and alleged that from amounts paid by said
Buyers to the escrow holder the plaintiff had received
$14,867.95 and the defendant had received only $16,367.96.
Defendant further alleged that he was entitled to credits on
his 1964 contract with plaintiff for payments made by the
escrow agent on plaintiff's portion of the mortgages above
mentioned.
As a further and affirmative defense and counterclaim
the defendant alleged that the plaintiff signed the
Rasmussen contract with defendant and James R.
Meldrum by reason of the fact that the deed required to be
executed by the terms of her 1964 contract with defendant
had not then been delivered, and that plaintiff signed said
Rasmussen contract without any agreement made by
defendant for termination or surrender of his rights under
his 1964 contract with plaintiff. Defendan also alleged that
said Rasmussen contract contains no provision for
allocation or division of payments to be made thereunder
between plaintiff and defendant but does contain the
following recital:
"25. The Seller agrees to furnish Walker Bank &
Trust Company, the escrow agent in this matter,
and the Buyer herein, with a statement of the portion each Seller is to receive from the purchase
price to be paid hereunder."
Also, that concurrently with execution of the Rasmussen
contract, two letters of instruction addressed to said
escrow agent were signed by plaintiff and defendant and
James R. Meldrum and delivered to said bank, and that
these letters of instruction to said escrow agent contained
the following recital:
9
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'The portion payable to Geneva Meldrum and
Klarence Meldrum shall be divded between them
as they may hereafter agree and notify said Walker
Bank & Trust Company or as may be determined
by court."
Copies of said letters of instruction to said escrow agent
are attached to defendant's answer and were incorporated
by reference (R.32, R.34).
Defendant further alleged that plaintiff, by her attorney,
had instructed said bank to refrain from disbursement of
any funds to the defendant except upon written authorization signed by the plaintiff or upon a court order. Also that
defendnat had repeatedly requested the plaintiff to agree
upon distribution of funds under said escrow in accordance
with rights of plaintiff and defendant as fixed by their 1964
contract but plaintiff has refused and continues to refuse to
agree to such distribution. Defendant further alleged that
at the time of plaintiff's commencement of this action the
total amount paid on the Rasmussen contract did not
exceed $42,464.73 of which one-half was allowable to James
R. Meldrum and that plaintiff had then received from
payments made by Rasmussen the sum of $16,117.95,
including $1,250.00 paid direct to plaintiff by Rasmussen;
also that defendant was entitled to creidts on his contract
with plaintiff for $8,004.11 paid to plaintiff prior to the
Rasmussen contract and other credits for payments made
by defendant on plaintiff's share of mortgage debt to Reed
Meldrum in the amount of $3,000.00 and on plaintiff's share
of mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society in
the amount of $2,407.00, making a total of credit then due
defendant on his 1964 contract with plaintiff in the amount
of at least $32,840.08.
10
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Defendant prayed for judgment and decree declaring
that the Rasmussen contract did not annul or supersede or
constitute a substitute for the 1964 contract of sale and that
said contract was still in full force and effect and that
defendant was not in default; also that Walker Bank &
Trust Company, as escrow agent, be directed to disburse
funds received by it in accordance with the decision of the
court unless otherwise agreed to by plaintiff and
defendant; also that defendant have his costs and a
reasonable fee for services of his attorney.
Plaintiff filed a reply to defendant's counterclaim (R.37)
admitting the execution of the 1964 contract of sale by
plaintiff and defendant and that a disagreement had
developed between plaintiff and defendant and that
plaintiff had given notice to the bank as alleged by
defendant, and denying generally the remaining allegations of the counterclaim.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
On February 11, 1972, defendant made demand upon
plaintiff for answers to interrogatories as show by the
record herein. (R. 39) Plaintiff made answer (R.43) under
date of February 22, 1972, to some of said interrogatories
and therin admitted that plaintiff had received from
defendant $8,004.11 prior to the Rasmussen contract; also
that defendant had then paid on plaintiff's portion of the
mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society
$1,450.00; also $2,055.69 on plaintiff's portion of the Reed
Meldrum mortgage; also that plaintiff had received from
the escrow agent, subsequent to the Rasmussen contract,
$4,502.50 in April or May 1969, $1,000.00 on or about May 7,
11
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1971, $1,500.00 on or about June 1, 1971 and $7,585.45
December 15, 1971, making a total admitted as then
received by plaintiff from the escrow agent $14,587.95; also
that plaintiff had received direct payment from Rasmussen in amount $1,250.00.
A pretrial hearing was had before the Court April 3,1972,
but no pre-trial order was made. (R.50)
A further hearing was had before the court on June 26,
1972 (R.52) and thereafter, under date of March 7,1973 the
Court signed and filed a Memorandum Decision (R.87) in
which it was adjudged and declared that the rights, duties
and obligations of the plaintiff and defendant should be
determined from the 1964 contract of sale and that such
agreement was "not modified, amended, merged or
novated'' by the contract with Rasmirssen.
Subsequent to the filing of this decision towit on March
25, 1973 the defendant filed a motion for allowance of
interest to the defendant on funds found by the court to be
due to defendant from the escrow holder, also for attorney
fees. (R.93) Plaintiff also filed a motion for allowance of
interest and attorney fee to plaintiff. (R.95) Counsel for
defendant also submitted to the court proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law and judgment (Court Exhibit "A")
and served a copy upon plaintiff's counself and requested
counsel for plaintiff to submit prior to July 10, 1973, a
statement of points of disagreement if any with such
proposed findings and conclusions.
A hearing was had before the court April 10, 1973 on
defendant's propsed findings of fact and conclusions of law
(Court Exhibit "A") Defendants Exhibit D-l-A was
offered by defendant and received (R.99). At this hearing
12
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counsel for plaintiff conceded the correctness of defendant's proposed findings of fact, but thereafter under date
of April 17, 1973 filed a Supplemental Memorandum
(R.105) alleging that plaintiff was in error in admitting a
payment of $3,369.60 claimed by defendant to have been
made on the Equitable Life Assurance mortgage prior to
the Rasmussen contract, and alleging that the correct
amount was $2,407.00 as set forth in defendant's answer
and counterclaim. In plaintiff's memorandum it was
admitted however, that except for the above item,
defendant's statement of credits claimed in his proposed
findings was correct. (R.105)
Thereafter, counsel for defendant prepared and submitted to the Court a revised draft of defendant's proposed
findings of fact, conclusios of law and judgment (R.115)
and served a copy upon plaintiff's counsel together with a
renewal of defendant's demand made 22 March 1973 for
answers to interrogatories. (R.125) In response to this
counsel for plaintiff filed Objections to Defendant's
Demand for Answers to Interrogatories and also submitted plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment (R.177) in which it was proposed
that plaintiff have judgment directing the escrow agent to
disburse $23,014.11 to plaintiff and that each party should
bear their own costs and attorney fees. Defendant filed
objections to Plaintiff's proposed findings, conclusions and
judgment. (R.182).
Under date of October 20, 1973 defendant filed a Motion
for Ruling Upon Legal Issues (R.139) and on October 27,
1973, made a renewal of demand for answers to
interrogatories dated July 26, 1973. (R.143)
13
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On November 13, 1973 the case came on for hearing on
pending motions and objections. (Tr A-l) Plaintiff's
Exhibits P-l, P-2, P-3 and P-4 were offered by plaintiff and
received. Defendant's Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and D-5
were offered by defendant but objected to by plaintiff and
the objection was sustained. The Court then directed
counsel for plaintiff to submit revised findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment and allowed defendant
ten days after receipt of same to file objections. Plaintiff
thereafter on November 28, 1973, submitted revised
proposed findings, conclusions and judgment (R-159-168)
and on December 5,1973 defendant filed objections thereto
(R-182).
Thereafter on December 11, 1973, the case came on for
hearing on pending motions and objection (R. 156, Tr. B-l).
The Court requested counsel for the respective parties to
endeavor to agree upon pending issues and then, upon
their announcement of failure to agree, the Court ordered
the case set for trial at 1:30 p.m. of that day. Counsel for
defendant then offered in evidence documentary exhibits
D-6 and D-7 to which plaintiff objected and the Court
sustained the objection (Tr. B-8, 11, 14). Defendant then
moved for a continuance to permit defendant to produce
further evidence as to receipts and disbursements made
by the escrow agent. (Tr. B-16) Plaintiff objected to this
and the Court denied defendant's motion and took the case
under advisement.
On December 17, 1973, defendant filed a motion for the
Court to make specific findings of fact upon all matters of
fact referred to in defendant's objections to plaintiff's
proposed findings of fact. (R.157)
14
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Thereafter the court signed an order overruling
defendant's objection (R.169) and signed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment substantially as proposed
by counsel for plaintiff. (R.159) These were filed with the
clker and entered under date of March 4, 1974. Defendant
then filed under date of March 12, 1974, a motion for new
trial. (R.173) This was overruled by the Court April 9,1974,
(r.175) and defendant filed notice of appeal May 6, 1974.
(R.176) Defendant filed his designation of record on appeal
May 16,1974 (R.203) and therein designated all pleadings,
motions and objections filed by the parties and all exhibits
and other papers and all orders of the court to be included
in the record. Reporters transcript was ordered May 1,1974.
Bond for costs on appeal was filed May 20,1974 (R.205). On
June 14, 1974 an order was signed by the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns, District Judge, extending time for filing
record on appeal to and including August 6, 1974. On
August 2,1974 a further order was signed by the Honorable
A. H. Ellett, Associate Justice, extending time for filing
the record on appeal to and including August 20, 1974.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE COURT FOUND AND ADJUDGED THAT
THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT SHOULD BE DETERMINED FROM A 1964
CONTRACT OF SALE EXECUTED BY THEM.
BUT THE COURT THEN RENDERED JUDGMENT INCONSISTENT WITH THAT CONTRACT
AND WHICH DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF FUNDS TO WHICH
HE WAS ENTITLED UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT.
15
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The Court decided on March 7,1973 that the 1964 contract
signed by plaintiff and defendant constitutes the contract
under which the rights of plaintiff and defendant herein
should be determined—and that such contract was not
modified or superseded by the Rasmussen contract. (R.87,
R. 196). It must therefore be decided (a) what payments
were required by that contract and when, and (b) what
payments were made and when. The Court's findings show
(R.165) that defendant had made payments to plaintiff in
the amount of $8,004.11 prior to the Rasmussen contract.
Also that plaintiff had thereafter, and prior to commencement of this action, received from the escrow agent
$14,587.95 and from Lowell Rasmussen $1,250.00 (R.43)—
making a total thus found to have been received by
plaintiff at that time to be $15,837.95 (R.165). In addition to
this, defendant had paid on plaintiff's portion of the
mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society at
least $1,450.00 and at least $2,055.69 on the plaintiff's
portion of the mortgage debt to Reed Meldrum (R.43). By
no reasonable view of the language of the 1964 contract can
it be said that defendant was in default at the time of the
commencement of this action. The contract called for
payment of a maximum of $2,500.00 per year to
plaintiff—without interest—except that in event of default
in payment of any installment the delinquency shall bear
interest at 3 per cent per annum.
Not only was the defendant not in default at the time of
commencement of this action but he had theretofore, in
writing, several times, proffered to allow the plaintiff to
receive from the escrow agent fifty per cent of payments
made by Rasmussen on the portion of the ranch covered by
defendant's contract with plaintiff until plaintiff should be
16
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fully paid in accordance with the 1964 contract. See
Exhibits offered by defendant—D-l, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5.
(Tr. 57) That proffer was continuously refused by plaintiff,
and her counsel constantly contended that the Rasmussen
contract superseded the 1964 contract and that plaintiff
was entitled to 65.81 per cent of moneys becoming due
from Rasmussen on defendant's portion of the purchase of
the ranch property. (See plaintiff's complaint.) (R.5).
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE A
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN
DEFAULT ON HIS CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF
THIS ACTION OR AT ANY TIME THEREAFTER.
The defendant alleged in his Answer and Counterclaim
that he had repeatedly requested plaintiff to agree upon
distribution of funds held under escrow in accordance with
the rights of plaintiff and defendant as fixed by the 1964
contract of sale and that plaintiff had at all times refused
to agree to such distribution. (R.30) Defendant further
alleged that the total amount of principal paid on the
Rasmussen contract at date of said answer and counterclaim was $42,464.73, of which y2 was allocable to James R.
Meldrum, and that plaintiff had then received $16,117.95
from funds paid under said contract, also that defendant
had paid to plaintiff, prior to date of the Rasmussen
contract $8,004.11 and was further entitled to credit on
account of payments made by him on plaintiff's portion of
mortgage debt to Equitable Life Assurance Society in the
sum of $2,407.00 and $3,000.00 on the Reed Meldrum mortgage prior to the Rasmussen contract,—also that there
17
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had been paid by the escrow agent subsequent to the
Rasmussen contract $1,500.00 on the Reed Meldrum
mortgage and $1,548.52 on the Equitable mortgage—making a total of $32,840.00 credits due to defendant on his
contract with plaintiff (including $262.50 paid on attorney
fee).
The defendant prayed that the Court interpret and
declare the effect of the 1964 contract and the Rasmussen
contract and adjudge that the 1964 contract was not superseded by the Rasmussen contract but was still in full force
and effect and that the defendant was not in default.
Plaintiff filed a Reply to defendant's counterclaim
(R.37) admitting the execution of the 1964 contract with the
defendant and denying generally defendants allegations as
to payments received by plaintiff but without any
specification as to what payments had been received.
Thereupon defendant under date of February 11, 1972
made demand upon plaintiff for answer to a series of
interrogatories. (R.39) To these interrogatories plaintiff
made answer under date of February 22, 1972 (R.43).
By these answers plaintiff admitted that she had
received from defendant prior to the Rasmussen contract
$8,004.11, and that defendant had then paid $1,450.00 on
plaintiff's share of mortgage debt to Equitable Life and
$2,055.68 on her share of the Reed Meldrum mortgage; also
that plaintiff had received from the escrow agent
$14,587.95 and $1,250.00 direct from Rasmussen. This made
a total of $27,347.74 admitted by plaintiff to have been paid
on the 1964 contract prior to institution of this suit.
These payments, thus admitted by plaintiff, exceeded by
several thousand dollars the amount required by the terms
of the 1964 contract. The contract called for payment of
$2,500.00 principal, without interest, on or before Decem18
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ber 1 of each year beginning with the year 1964. That totals
$20,000.00 as of February 1972. But defendant was also to
have credit for payments made by him on plaintiff's
portion of mortgage debts which by plaintiff's admissions
amounted then to $3,505.68. All of which shows that by
plaintiff's admissions defendant was not in default under
the terms of the 1964 contract.
It is obvious that plaintiff's excuse for instituting this
action in January 1972 was a mistaken theory that the
Rasmussen contract superseded the 1964 contract—and a
further mistaken theory that plaintiff was entitled to
receive 65.81 per cent of all sums payable under the
Rasmussen contract for defendant's half interest in the
ranch property.
Plaintiff will probably argue that additional sums were
due plaintiff by reason of the clause in the 1964 contract
that, in case of sale of defendant's interest in the ranch for
a sum in excess of $40,000.00, then the plaintiff should
receive one-half of such excess.
But what is the meaning of that sentence? Does it give
plaintiff a right of action against defendant after he had
consented to allow plaintiff to receive from the escrow
agent one-half of all payments made on defendant's share
of funds from the Rasmussen contract—until plaintiff was
fully paid in accordance with the 1964 contract. Does it
mean that at a time when plaintiff had in fact received
several thousands of dollars more than was required by
the 1964 contract, she could then put the defendant to the
expense of defending an action on the contract? Does it
mean that at a time when nothing in excess of $40,000.00
had been paid on defendant's interest in the Rasmussen
contract, the plaintiff could claim a default by defendant
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on her contract with him? Defendant submits that the
answer to these questions is obviously "NO".
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S OFFERS TO ALLOW
PLAINTIFF TO RECEIVE FROM THE ESCROW
AGENT PAYMENTS IN EXCESS OF INSTALLMENTS WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO
RECEIVE UNDER THE 1964 CONTRACT.
Defendant offered documentary evidence (Tr. 57, D-1,
D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5) showing offers made by defendant prior
to institution of this action to allow plaintiff to receive
one-half of installments received and to be received by the
escrow agent for credit of defendant and plaintiff until
plaintiff was fully paid under the terms of the 1964
contract. Counsel for Plaintiff objected to reception of
such evidence upon the ground that it was irrelevant and
the objection was sustained. (Tr. 59)
Defendant submits that that ruling was erroneous. The
evidence went to the heart of issues raised by defendant's
answer and counterclaim and the ruling cannot be
reconciled with the Court's decision that the 1964 contract
is controlling herein. The exhibits offered showed that at
various times prior to the commencement of this action by
plaintiff, the defendant offered to allow plaintiff to receive
from the escrow agent one-half of payments received on
defendant's portion of the ranch until plaintiff would be
fully paid under the terms of the 1964 contract. Exhibit D-1
showed such offer made as early as September 1969. Exhibits D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5 showed that the offer was repeated
at various times prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE
SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS TO PAYMENTS MADE
TO PLAINTIFF AND PAYMENTS MADE UPON
MORTGAGES FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS
ENTITLED TO CREDIT UNDER THE 1964
CONTRACT.

In proposed findings of fact submitted to the Court by
defendant, it was meticulously set forth the amounts and
times of payments made to plaintiff and upon mortgages
for which defendant was entitled to credit. (R.115)
Demand was made upon plaintiff to specifically state what
objections, if any, plaintiff made to such proposed
findings. (R. 125) At the hearing before court on April 10,
1973, counsel for plaintiff accepted the recapitulation as
set out in defendants proposed findings. (R.105) Thereafter, however, on April 17, 1973, counsel for plaintiff
submitted to the court a Supplemental Memorandum
(R.105) in which he stated that he had erred as to an item
of $3,369.60 which he asserted should be $2,407.00. But in
that memorandum he accepted defendant's recapitulation
as to remaining items.
In spite of the foregoing admissions by plaintiff as to
defendant's proposed findings of fact, the court failed to
make specific findings on said matters and adopted
findings of fact proposed by counsel for plaintiff (R.159)
which fail to show essential facts and contain conclusions
of law not supported by the evidence and which wholly
faily to show offers made by defendant to allow plaintiff to
receive from the escrow agent payments sufficient to fully
comply with the 1964 contract.
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POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF AN AGREEMENT FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME AND IN AWARDING INTEREST TO
PLAINTIFF TO WHICH SHE WAS NOT ENTITLED.
In paragraph 10 of plaintiff's proposed findings of fact
(R.163)(and which were adopted by the Court over the
objections of defendant) it is recited that in April 1970 an
agreement was entered into between the sellers and
purchasers under the Rasmussen contract whereby it was
agreed that the 1970 payment under the Rasmussen
contract was to be deferred and that the purchasers
agreed that in consideration of such deferment they would
pay eight per cent interest instead of five and one-half per
cent. In the following paragraph, towit No. 10 of said
proposed findings, it is receited that the payment made by
Rasmussens on May 5, 1971 included $14,825.23 as interest
"of which $3,323.03 represented the interest on the
Plaintiff's aforesaid $19,025.00 which sum of money is now
being held in escrow by the Walker Bank and Trust
Company of Provo, Utah and should be turned to the
Plaintiff".
Defendant specifically objected to said proposed finding
(R-182,183) (and also to finding Nos. 7, 9, 11 and 12) upon
the ground that they erroneously assumed that plaintiff
was entitled to interest not required by the 1964 contract.
Defendant also contended that nothing in the 1970
extension agreement or in the Rasmussen contract
required payment of interest to plaintiff except as provided by the language of the 1964 contract.
A reading of the 1970 extension agreement (R.68) clearly
shows the merit of defendant's objection. There is no word
22
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of agreement therein which calls for payment to plaintiff,
nor any word of agreement between defendant and
plaintiff as to whom the additional interest, or any interest
accruing under the terms of the original Rasmussen
contract shall be paid. And the Court had, by its
Memorandum Decisions of March 7, 1973 ruled that the
rights of plaintiff and defendant are to be determined by
teh 1964 agreement. The agreement specifically provides
that no interest shall be charged except in case of default
by defendant and then only at the rate of three per cent per
annum.
The evidence herein which was offered by defendant
(See exhibit D-l) shows that as early as September 1969
and at numerous times thereafter, (D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5) the
defendant offered to allow plaintiff to receive one-half of
payment made to the escrow agent on the portion of the
ranch covered by the 1964 contract.
The admissions of plaintiff (R.105) further show that the
plaintiff did in fact receive currently from the escrow
agent one-half of each installment paid on the Rasmussen
contract on defendant's portion of the ranch (excepting
only the 1971 installment—and defendant offered to allow
plaintiff to receive one-half of that—and she did receive
$7,585.45 of it). These payments so received by plaintiff
were in addition to payments made by the escrow agent on
mortgages referred to in the 1964 contract.
In Finding No. 11 (R. 163) the Court erred in adopting a
conclusion of law embodied in plaintiff's proposed finding
No. 11 to the effect that $3,323.03 of a payment made by
Rasmussens on May 5, 1971 "represented" interested
which should be turned to the plaintiff".
That conclusions is based upon a contention of plaintiff
that plaintiff is entitled to interest on one-half of the excess
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over $40,000.00 for which defendant sold his interest in the
property covered by his 1964 contract with plaintiff and
that such interested should be computed from the date of
the Rasmussen contract. In other words, plaintiff's counsel contends that a sale was made as soon an executory
contract of sale was signed—regardless of when payment
was received—and regardless of when, or whether ever,
defendant received his $40,000.00 under the contract of
sale.
Defendant submits that the language of the 1964 contract
cannot be so construed. The agreement was that
4
'In the event the buyer sells his interest in the
above described property or assigns this contract
in the lifetime of the seller for a sum in excess of the
purchase price herein, Forty Thousand Dollars,
that in such event he will pay one-half of the excess
to the seller from the first three payments under
such sale. ,,
That cannot reasonably be construed to bind defendant to
pay interest to plaintiff on the purchase price until it was
received from his purchaser. And certainly not until the
date the purchase was bound to pay. The Rasmussen
contract called for a total price of $158,000.00 for the
ranch—including the James R. Meldrum half interest. The
purchase price was to be payable in installments, viz; a
down payment of $5,000.00 ($4,000.00 of which went to
realtor's commission) and $20,000.00 on or before May 1,
1969 and the balance in annual installments of $19,000.00
plus interest at 5V2 per cent per annum on the 1st day of
May in the years 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976.
It will readilly be seen that if defendant should be
chargeable for interest on one-half of the excess over
$40,000.00 of the sale price regardless of when the price
would be paid, it would be an unconscionable burden for
him.
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The ruling, granting interest to plaintiff, and denying
interest to defendant, fails to give consideration to the fact
that defendant not only consented at all times to allow
plaintiff to receive from the escrow agent one-half of payments received on the Rasmussen contract until plaintiff
was fully paid under the 1964 contract—but also that
plaintiff refused to let the escrow agent pay to defendant
the balance due defendant. He was thereby deprived of
interest from August 18, 1972 (when final payment was
made to the escrow agent) until after the decision of this
case on February 26, 1974.
Furthermore, counsel for plaintiff, in his proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, which
were adopted by the Court, claimed interested in the
aggregate amount of $4,122.96 (R.166) In arriving at that
figure, counsel wholly failed to give consideration to the
fact that plaintiff had currently received from the escrow
agent payments which greatly exceed the instalments of
$2,500.00 per year required by the 1964 contract. The
excess over that figure should have been credited on the
$19,025.00 claimed by plaintiff under the clause calling for
payment to her of one-half of the excess over $40,000.00 for
which defendant's interest in the ranch was sold. But
counsel, in his zeal to get the ultimate amount from the
defendant, induced the Court to allow interest on the
$19,025.00 during the entire period from date of the
Rasmussen contract until the date of judgment her in.
Defendant submits that he was not in default at the time
of commencement of this action, nor at any time
thereafter, and that the award of interest to plaintiff and
denial of interest to defendant cannot be approved.
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT JUDGMENT FOR INTEREST AND FOR
HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES.

Plaintiff's complaint was based upon the irrational and
arbitrary contention that her 1964 contract with her son
was superseded by the Rasmussen contract and that
plaintiff was entitled to 65.81 per cent of all funds due and
to become due under that contract on the interest in the
ranch property covered by the 1964 contract. The trial
court ruled against that contention (R.87)—and that ruling
was obviously correct as a careful reading of both
contracts will show. Also it seems obvious that the mother
must have had some very bad advice or she would not have
begun this lawsuit against her son when she had already
received payments greatly in excess of installments due
under her contract with him and when he had repeatedly
offered to allow her to receive a greater percentage of
funds paid and to be paid under the Rasmussen contract
than was required under the 1964 contract. These points
were fully set forth in defendant's answer and counterclaim and counsel was thereby charged with notice of
defendant's rights. But in spite of this, and even after the
Court had announced its decision that the 1964 contract
was not superseded or modified by the Rasmussen
contract, plaintiff's counsel continued to delay disposition
of the case by dilatory motions and objections. Defendant
repeatedly submitted to counsel for plaintiff demands for
answers to interrogatories as to payments received by
plaintiff and as to receipts and distribution of funds by the
escrow agent—also as to offers made by defendant to allow
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payments ;<> •- nid<n >-. ;, i,rM':i i- :>v H 91, R.125 hut
plaintiff ine\< usahh delayed answer . - u* h mp i noua
f
tories ;m*l • HI< .;.
- *ikt* specific ar^wers H\ <V\Mdilator) ^-.M - a ureal and needless but den was put upon
the Court and upon counsel lor defendant -and an unconscionably lengthy and confus?"$i r ^ o r d was needlessly
accumulated.
Defendant further submits that the i Mir <•:*!<*.:• n. •*
jecting defendants r«;i|u* -t Un Jit.v f , ,>sts and * ;^ M
,«>
l
fee. The t <MI»M jndicated its reason |(>< ^u h a^:o*i ;.*
follows: (R. 166)
. "21. The Court further finds that each of the par ties
visited the same Attorney for the drafting of the
original 1964 contract and that said parties were
acting for their mutual interest and benefit under
the Rasmussen contract, and that said Court's
determination of the rights of the parties and
obligations of said parties was not the fault of either
of said parties, and therefore no attorneys fees or
costs are awarded with each of said parties to bear
their own costs and attorney's fees",
Defendant submits that under the facts and cii cumstances of this case that conclusion of the court was clearly
erroneous. The mere fact that the parties relied upon the
same attorney foi the drafting of the original contract
between them ought not to be made a reason for denying
costs and attorney fee to one of the parties who is
needlessly put to expense and trouble of defending aginst
a suit brought to attempt to force him payment from him
of an amount greatly in excess of the amount called for by
that contract. And if the attorney who drafted the original
contract becomes attorney for one party against the other,
and is succeeded by another attorney for the plaintiff, who
institutes and action against defendant on an unjust claim,
should that be any basis for denying costs and attorney fee
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to the party who was not at fault or in default? Can it be
said the plaintiff was not at fault in instituting this action
where she claimed 65.81 percent of funds for which the
contract property was sold when the contract clearly did
not contemplate such a result?
And when if it is further shown that at the time of
institution of this suit plaintiff had been paid far more than
/the installments required by the contract between the
parties—and that defendant had theretofore repeatedly
offered to allow plaintiff to continue to receive installments substantially in excess of installments required by
their contract—can there be any basis for denying the
defendant his costs and attorney fee under a contract
which specifically provides that in case of a suit the party
at fault shall pay to the other his costs and attorney fee?
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE TO PERMIT DEFENDANT TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE
OF PAYMENTS MADE BY THE ESCROW
AGENT FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO CREDIT.
On November 13, 1973, this case was called for hearing
on defendant's motion for ruling upon legal issues and on
plaintiff's objections to proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment proposed by defendant. (Tr.
A-8) The Court on that day requested counsel for the parties to endeavor to agree upon remaining issues. Counsel
discussed the matter and reported to the court that they
could not agree. The Court then called upon counsel for
plaintiff to state his points of objection to defendant's pro28
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posed findings of lad, (TY. A-page 8 9 10^ Thereafter
defendant offered documentary exhibits iD-i. b-2, D 3. D-4
and D-5) (Tr. A-p. 57, 58, 59, 60) to show offers by defender.I
to allow payments to be made to plaintiff by the esn-n*
agent Plaintiff object to this upon the ground \UM < ^a>.
irrelevant and the Court sustained the ol-jt^ion IVUMI
dant also offered in evidence Exhibits I) 6 ;i:i<i ; > 7 *o ;*i m r
payments made to plaintiff and upon mortgages by the escrow agent. Plaintiff objected to this offer and the Court
sustained the objection. Tr B-p.8-10) Defendant then
moved U>v ;: ' = >ntmiiance **•'*• die hearing to allow defendant
to call witni'S^s to prove1 pa\m*-T;{.- made by the escrow
agent. '! * 1: 'J Pi.-rirnfi objected *•) this and the Court
sustained the objection. The case was then taken i inder
advisement by the cVmrt
Defendant then tiled whjtH hui:, w, pi oposed fii idings of
fact and conclusions of law and judgment propsed by
plaintif* h :U2- and al.M> n\vi] a ;m>tion for the court to
i nake specif^ findings cr is;io oi fact referred to in
defendant's objections -H i.i',"1 Defendant's objections
and motion were overruled and denied by the Court and
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment substantially as proposed by plaintiff were signed and
entered. Defendant contends that these are erroneous in
the matters set forth in defendant's objections oi i file
herein. Defendant also contends that findings Nos. 7, 9,10,
11,19, 20 and 21 are not findings of fact but conclusions of
law and are not supported by the evidence. Also that the
court erred in refusing to show offers by defendant of
documentary exhibits to show payments made by the
escrow agent arid offers i nade by defendant to permit
payments to plaintiff in excess of payments required by
the 1964 contract.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion the defendant (appellant) submits that this
court should reverse the rulings of the trial court on points
herein contended by defendant to be erroneous, and direct
judgment to be entered in favor of defendant as prayed for
in his counterclaim.
The points referred to in this brief, and relied upon by
defendant for redetermination by the appelate court, are
so well established that it appears to counsel for defendant
that citations of cases or authorities to support such points
will be wholly needless. But if counsel for plaintiff
questions this, and cites any legal authorities to the
contrary, then counsel for defendant will reply thereto.
Respectfully submitted,
Will L. Hoyt
Attorney for
Defandant
(Appellant)
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